

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO /NP		X		
20	C/ACIS	X			
21	D/OSWR		X		
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary

11 Feb 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

DEPT. OF STATE HAS
REVIEWED

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Consensus Building

Ironical as it sounds, we must convince our friends and others that CW proliferation is an urgent and serious problem that must be dealt with now. This requires a diplomatic strategy and a public diplomacy strategy (speeches, articles, etc.).

In this process, we must show that the problem can be effectively managed without disrupting legitimate commerce. (The chemical industry has proven cooperative thus far, in part because it does not want its reputation blackened by association with chemical weapons.) We should also make sure that our own export controls and military assistance practices are as good as possible to ensure credibility.

Intelligence

I believe that CW intelligence needs a higher priority and more resources. In addition, we need a better and quicker joining of policy and intelligence considerations.

In the nuclear area, we have for years had a highly effective interagency group (at the working level) to coordinate intelligence and policy matters on sensitive proliferation-risk issues and countries. We need an analog in the CW area. To be effective, it needs information. That underscores the need to give higher priority to CW proliferation intelligence gathering. The Administration's response to the Quayle Amendment (due March 15) should reflect our expanded needs.

Bilateral And Multilateral Actions

We need a three-tiered approach: government-to-government efforts, complementary efforts in the CW quadrilateral (UK, FRG, France and US), and possible actions in the OECD Chemicals Group.

Besides consensus building, our government-to-government and quadrilateral efforts should aim at:

- o stopping or at least significantly slowing CW-related exports to particular problem countries; and
- o building a political basis for informal and possibly more formal export controls by others and for related actions within the OECD.

We should use intelligence to support prompt, private diplomatic demarches to interrupt or prevent undesirable exports or other CW-related developments. Our experience in the case of Iraq demonstrates that a high degree of success can be achieved from such approaches and that OECD governments can usually find a way to restrict objectionable activities if they see the need to do so.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

We should work closely with key Allies and, as in the nuclear non-proliferation area, we should develop a continuing dialogue with the Soviets on the CW problem and proposed actions.

As we work toward a consensus among major countries, we could consider initiating some action within the OECD Chemicals Group to obtain more insight into the views of European countries with which the OECD works closely. At the very least, the OECD affords another way of alerting major suppliers to the problem.

In all our efforts, stemming the spread of chemical weapons should be put forth as the principle objective. Realistically, however, we must acknowledge that this is mainly a way of buying time and delaying development. But buying time can be important. Perhaps more important, the whole effort will, if done right, have the effect of strengthening the barriers against the use of chemical weapons.

Ken

Kenneth L. Adelman

cc: William J. Casey
Robert C. McFarlane

CONFIDENTIAL